

**TOP SECRET**

19 November 1963

DIA review(s) completed.

**Cuban Subversive Efforts in Latin America**


- I. Hard evidence of Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America came to light early this month in Venezuela;



25X1

- II. The large arms cache found on the coast of Venezuela on 1 November provides the most incontrovertible--and the most dramatic--proof of major Cuban complicity in subversive activity elsewhere in Latin America that has come to light in recent years.

- A. The cache--approximately three tons of it--included automatic rifles, submachineguns, recoilless rifles, mortars, bazookas, demolition charges, and ammunition.



25X


25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~-2-~~



25X1

that this particular type of rifle is used only by the Cuban armed forces in Latin America. Shortly after the fall of Batista, the revolutionary government of Cuba bought 22,500 of these rifles from Fabrique Nationale, identical to those found in the cache.




25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

25X1



B. There may be another cache, or one en route.

1. In the cache was 50 caliber machinegun ammunition, but no 50 caliber machineguns.
2. There were light machinegun tripods, but no light machineguns.

C. The cache was found on 1 November by the Venezuelan National Guard

25X1

1. It was buried in the sand on a farm owned by a relative of a leading Venezuelan Castro sympathizer, Ignacio Luis Arcaya; Arcaya's son is a member of


**TOP SECRET**

-4-

the Communist Party and is known to have traveled to Cuba last year.

2. It was found on the Paraguana Peninsula, the point that juts out into the Caribbean and constitutes the Venezuelan territory closest to Cuba; it is in Falcon state, the scene of the most active guerrilla warfare being carried on by the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), the Venezuelan Communists' paramilitary arm.

25X1

- 
- D. How the weapons were transported to the site where they were found is not yet established, but the

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

-5-

Venezuelan government assumes they were shipped from Cuba by sea.

1. Some 300 yards from the cache site was found a 16-foot aluminum boat with a 40 hp outboard motor.
2. This could have been used to transport the weapons from a larger vessel standing offshore.

K. The Venezuelan military is concerned over its inability to intercept, or even to identify, the aircraft which in recent weeks has been making frequent nighttime incursions over Falcon State and which, they believe, <sup>is</sup> are supplying the guerrilla units.

1. One ranking Venezuelan officer told the US Air Attache in Caracas on 15 November that he intends to suggest to the Defense Minister that the US be asked to provide a radar-equipped USAF plane to operate from a Venezuelan airbase to seek out and destroy the intruder.
2. After the plane is shot down, he said, the Venezuelan Air Force would claim responsibility and the wreckage, he believes, would attest further to Cuban subversion.
3. We have no information as to where this intruding aircraft is based; the Venezuelans have tentatively

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

**-6-**

**identified it as a C-46 or C-47 and range factors for these planes make it seem unlikely that the plane could be based in Cuba.**

25X1

- III. The Venezuelan arms cache is an apparent exception to the rule Castro has followed in the past few years—to avoid any direct arms shipments that could be traced back to Cuba.**
- A. Cubans have been telling extremist leaders of the hemisphere that Cuba will provide training, funds,**

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

-7-

propaganda, but not weapons or leaders. (Guerrilla movements are expected to buy, steal, or capture their own weapons and ammunition).

B. Castro would still prefer to keep Cuba's helping hand concealed in any revolutionary outbreak or terrorist campaign.

1. Obvious Cuban involvement would make it easier to rally OAS support for countermeasures.

2. It could also cost local revolutionaries much of the public sympathy and support they need at home.

C. But Castro's growing need for some new dramatic victory to restore the lagging momentum of his revolution is apparently causing him to take greater risks.

D. Although Cuba's subversive assets in Latin America--with the possible exception of Venezuela--do not appear strong enough for decisive revolutionary action in the near future, the Cuban contention is that action--guerrilla warfare, terrorism, etc.--must be launched now.


1. As Che Guevara explained in his article in the regime's official theoretical journal last month, the initiation of guerrilla action creates the

**TOP SECRET**

**-8-**

conditions necessary for ultimate victory; that the necessary conditions do not automatically arise.

2. He explained that the correct method is to force the governments into progressively more oppressive acts, thus forcing the public more and more to the side of the revolutionaries.
3. He granted that many good revolutionaries will be lost in the initial struggle, but claimed that this is a necessary sacrifice.
4. This echoes Castro's own exhortation of last July calling on "fighting revolutionaries" throughout Latin America to "open the breach."



**TOP SECRET**

25X1



25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040013-6

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040013-6